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The Public Rivalry between Regulated and Joint Stock Corporations and the Development 
of Seventeenth-Century Corporate Constitutions. 
 
The history of seventeenth-century English overseas trade and the commercial debates it 
generated is traditionally and most frequently told as a battle between free trade and monopoly.i 
This narrative extends from the expansion of overseas-chartered enterprise at the middle of the 
sixteenth century to the aftermath of the Glorious Revolution and its protagonists are the 
independent merchant and the joint stock company ± the respective harbingers of the modern 
liberal economy and the modern multinational corporation.ii Yet in focusing on the contest 
between free and monopolistic trade this narrative also downplays the institutional and 
constitutional development of the trading company itself and thus elides the nuances and 
complexities of seventeenth-century debates over the organization of overseas trade.iii In 
particular, it collapses the distinction between different forms of corporate commerce and the 
changing relationship between regulated and joint stock companies. Unlike their joint-stock 
counterparts that operated on the basis of a shared trading capital, regulated companies did not 
themselves trade. Instead, they were guild-like bodies that provided a governing structure within 
which their members traded on separate accounts. In this respect, regulated companies 
manifested qualities of corporate identity and self-governance that were central to early modern 
English society and government.iv During the seventeenth century these contrasting forms of 
corporation came to embody rival approaches to corporate government and society, as well as to 
the political economy and imagined geography of English overseas trade. The result was a 
vibrant debate over the respective merits of the joint stock and regulated company models that 
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reflected and informed contests over µfree¶ trade at the same time as it reshaped public 
perceptions of trading companies and their institutional and constitutional development. 
 
This article examines the changing terms of the seventeenth-century public debate over the 
regulated and joint stock corporate forms. Although the Merchant Adventurers Company and the 
Eastland Company were older examples of the regulated form, this debate ultimately came to 
centre on the joint stock East India Company and the regulated Levant Company. These two 
companies ± the East India and Levant ± became, by the second half of the seventeenth century, 
emblems for the constitutional argument between the two forms. Through much of the first half 
of the century, the conception of the trading company as an association of members joined in 
shared and consensual government linked these two companies and the regulated and joint stock 
corporate models more broadly.v  During the latter half of century, however, the governing styles 
of these models diverged. Constitutional change at home and escalating competition with 
European rivals abroad encouraged changes in the East India Company and the Royal African 
Company that increased the influence of major shareholders and placed these bodies in a 
stronger position to prosecute interlopers and act aggressively towards extra-European polities. 
In response to the growing power and increasingly authoritarian character of joint stock trading 
companies as well as the persistent influence of free trade (or anti-corporate) arguments, their 
commercial rivals and political opponents held up the regulated company model as an 
association of equal and identifiable merchants and an alternative both to increasingly 
controversial, impersonal, and hierarchical joint stock companies and the disorderliness of 
unregulated (or free) trade. In this way, the regulated company provided a foil to the free trade 
arguments that contested the need for corporate organization of overseas trade. The regulated 
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company proposed an alternative to free trade that was open, accessible, inclusive, but also 
corporate.  
 
This analysis of the seventeenth-century debate about the corporate constitution offers two major 
contributions to the history of early modern English expansion, political economy, and 
commercial debate. First, it recovers the significance of the regulated company. Historians of the 
joint stock company have frequently dismissed the regulated company as µa relic of the past¶ 
while holding up the English and Dutch East India Companies as the forbearers of modern 
capitalism.vi Historians of the seventeenth-century development of free trade, on the other hand, 
have focused on the process by which partnerships and commission agents replaced regulated 
companies as the organising institutions of trade between England and the Baltic and northwest 
Europe.vii Yet the changing relationship between regulated and joint stock companies reveals a 
set of ideological arguments that were central to shaping the organisation of English overseas 
trade and (QJODQG¶V interactions with the extra-European world.  Regulated companies were at 
the centre of political economic debate in seventeenth-century England.viii Second, the public 
debate between regulated and joint stock companies reveals a history of corporate constitutional 
change that helps to explain both the adaptability and the longevity of trading companies in the 
face of competition and opposition overseas and at home. Through the early modern period, 
corporations were undergoing a process of constitutional development that paralleled and 
intersected with that of the state but was also distinct from it.ix The public debates about the 
respective merits of the regulated and joint stock forms went beyond discussion of the 
commercial performance of these corporate models to instead focus more broadly on questions 
of accessibility, the basis for membership and participation in company government, and the 
4 
relationship between members and directors. The reform of the joint stock companies in the 
wake of the Glorious Revolution reflected the criticisms made by those advocating the regulated 
company form and the partial integration of features that had become associated with regulated 
companies in the course of decades of public and pamphlet debate. 
 
This article traces the emergence of different conceptions of the trading company out of 
seventeenth-century corporate debates and the impact of this emergence on the institutional and 
constitutional development of the trading company. The first section shows how shared 
membership and similar corporate cultures linked the regulated and joint stock company models 
from the end of the sixteenth century through much of the first half of the seventeenth. The 
second section traces the subsequent institutional evolution of joint stock companies that 
gradually differentiated the joint stock form from its regulated cousin from the mid-seventeenth 
century. The third shows how the institutional divergence of the joint stock and regulated 
companies, together with growing commercial competition between the Levant and East India 
Companies, led to the rise of public and pamphlet debates that set the two corporate forms 
against one another. The last section focuses on the contest between the joint stock and regulated 
corporate models in the wake of the Glorious Revolution. In the course of the contests over 
political economy that followed the Glorious Revolution, the rivalry between these models 
ultimately helped to transform both. Public debate, and the example of the regulated company, 
helped to subordinate the Royal African and East India Companies to the English state and to 
Parliament and made the trade of each more accessible to outsiders. At the same time, the use of 
the regulated company as an alternative model to the joint stock encouraged a transformation in 
how contemporaries understood that corporate form. Writers promoting the regulated company 
5 
emphasized the freedom to trade that they allowed their members over the traditional rationale 
for regulated companies, which depicted them as societies of merchants designed to govern and 
regulate trade. In this way, arguments for the regulated company channeled enthusiasm for free 
trade into a new argument for corporations that championed their inclusivity over the traditional 




From the end of the sixteenth century until the middle of the seventeenth, regulated and joint 
stock companies stood as equal and deeply interconnected corporate foundations for English 
overseas expansion. Through the seventeenth century, a number of regulated companies 
governed the expansion and development of English trade in Northern Europe and the 
Mediterranean. The Merchant Adventurers and Eastland Companies, and, most notably, the 
Levant Company were central both to the political economy of English trade and the social 
organization of /RQGRQ¶V burgeoning merchant community.x  The seventeenth century also saw 
the emergence of joint stock companies (to add to the Russian joint stock of the mid sixteenth 
century) for long-distance trade to Asia (1600) and Africa (1660) and +XGVRQ¶V Bay (1670). The 
founders and backers of colonial enterprises also turned to the joint stock form to attract 
investment to settlement companies in North America, including the Virginia, Plymouth, New 
England, and Massachusetts Bay Companies. Companies shifted between the two forms 
throughout the seventeenth century. The Levant Company initially functioned as a joint stock but 
became a regulated company sometime in the fifteen-nineties while the Russia Company became 
a regulated company in 1669. Although the joint stocks endured the century (with the exception 
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of the Virginia Company and the Massachusetts Bay Company), by the end of the century the 
Merchant Adventurers and Eastland Companies ceased to be the important commercial entities 
they had been at the beginning of the seventeenth centuries, effectively obviated by the 
governmental structure provided by the Navigation Acts of the sixteen-fifties and sixteen-sixties. 
Only the Levant Company endured throughout the seventeenth century as a consistent promoter 
of the regulated form.xi 
 
These corporate forms shared many characteristics. Both regulated and joint stock corporations 
were µinstitutions of government¶ and µbodies corporate and politick¶.xii In this respect, they were 
at once legally constituted associations of individuals that comprised an invisible, immortal, and 
soulless body and societies of merchants who organized themselves for the purpose of 
conducting international trade.xiii They were designed both to uphold the interests of the Crown 
at home and overseas and to bring government ± in a broader sense ± (or what contemporaries 
typically called µRUGHUOLQHVV¶ to trade. Proponents of corporate trade argued that these bodies 
ensured that merchants cooperated in the face of foreign competition and allowed them to 
present a united front before foreign governments. The companies often directly supported the 
VWDWH¶V diplomatic apparatus. From its inception in the fifteen-eighties, for example, the Levant 
Company financed the English FURZQ¶V embassy to the Ottoman Court and the Russia Company 
did the same with regards to the English diplomatic presence in Russia.xiv  
 
Despite their shared legal and social foundations, the two forms of trading corporation 
approached the government and organization of overseas trade in different ways. The regulated 
company restricted access to established trades to µPHUH PHUFKDQWV¶ on the understanding that 
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such restrictions guaranteed the quality of goods and the professional standards of the FRPSDQ\¶V 
members.xv The joint stock company, on the other hand, was a sixteenth-century institutional 
innovation that built both on the model of the medieval guild and on existing forms of 
commercial partnership to allow a large group of investors including both merchants and non-
merchants to pool their resources to open new trades or to carry on commercial operations that 
were too risky or expensive for an individual or small group of traders.xvi Nevertheless, through 
the first half of the seventeenth century, the distinction between company and open trade was 
more consequential than that between different kinds of corporate organization. The charters for 
companies rarely specified what form of commercial organization they were to adopt. The 
Levant &RPSDQ\¶V transition from a joint-stock to a regulated company form in the fifteen-
nineties seems, meanwhile, to have rested not on any ideological basis, but on the realization of 
the FRPSDQ\¶V members that they did not need to pool their capital to trade to Levantine markets 
that were proximate to familiar Italian ports and had been frequented by Italian and French 
merchants for centuries.xvii  
 
The regulated Levant Company exemplified the social and corporate characteristics of the early 
seventeenth-century trading company. Originally incorporated in 1581 and granted a perpetual 
charter in 1605, the Governor and Company of Merchants of England trading into the Levant 
Seas was charged and endowed with the government of English trade to the Ottoman Empire. 
Through the early seventeenth century, the value of the Levant &RPSDQ\¶V trade frequently 
rivaled or even exceeded that of the joint stock East India Company and it drew its members 
from the most exclusive of /RQGRQ¶V livery companies and merchant elite.xviii Meanwhile, 
although its members and their factors traded independently and on their own account, the 
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Company chartered general ships to carry its PHPEHUV¶ goods, set the terms upon which other 
English vessels sailed to Levantine ports, established guidelines for the trade of its members and 
their factors, policed the moral and religious life of its factories, and collected duties and fees to 
fund its operations and to pay the ambassadors, consuls, and agents that represented it overseas 
and administered justice within the factory communities that rose up in Ottoman cities. When 
new freemen swore on joining the company that they would have µno singular regard to 
yourselfe, in hurt & prejudice of the Commonweale of this Fellowship¶, they testified to its 
social and corporate foundations.xix  
 
The culture of the Levant Company, like that of other corporate bodies, was notable both for its 
exclusivity and for its participatory and deliberative nature. In self-conception and frequently in 
practice, the company was a self-governing and self-regulating society of equal members and its 
court of assistants and officers were elected and decisions made in the general court on the basis 
of µone man, one vote¶.xx The centrality of the µcorporate commonwealth¶ to overseas trade was 
never uncontested. Merchant societies were frequently limited to merchants living in London and 
often excluded tradesmen and others who were not apprenticed as merchants. To the voices of 
those seeking access to trades monopolized by companies, government officials added their own 
complaints about bodies that refused to give adequate deference to royal and state authority. The 
Levant &RPSDQ\¶V jealous defense of its authority over English trade in the Levant particularly 
led to consternation among the royal ambassadors who resided at Constantinople as the 
representatives both of Crown and company, one of whom complained of the µinsolent society¶ 
that preferred µthe single vote of others of inferior quality, before his advises¶.xxi Such critiques, 
however, only underscored the fact that companies were governments for the management of 
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trade. In response to cries for a free trade to Levant during the Interregnum, the &RPSDQ\¶V 
directors argued that its members constituted a µunited Society of persons tutored and bred up to 
the trade, and injoying the mutuall Concells of each other¶. By virtue of shared government and 
mutual support, they were able to defend their trade against foreign competitors and Ottoman 
despotism, represent their interests to the English state, manage their trade to the common good, 
and ensure the future of the trade by bringing up new merchants in the languages, customs, and 
commercial skills necessary to survive and thrive in the Levant.xxii 
 
The corporate culture evident in the Levant Company was widely shared among trading 
companies, including joint stocks like the Virginia Company and the East India Company.xxiii 
The different commercial structures certainly led, in some respects, to distinct institutional 
dynamics, especially in the tensions between merchant and gentlemen investors that 
characterized the early joint stock companies and the greater frequency with which the governing 
committees of joint stock companies met.xxiv Yet, through the first half century of the 
seventeenth century, there existed substantial overlap between Levant and East India Company 
directors and the latter body substantially adhered in crucial respects to the social and governing 
style of its regulated cousin.xxv Levant merchants featured prominently among the founders of 
the East India Company and, in the sixteen-twenties, over half of the Levant company directors 
were also directors of the East India Company. Both companies emphasized qualities of 
fellowship and brotherhood and, through its first decades, the East India Company operated on 
the basis of a series of separate and short-term joint stocks that partially disassociated the 
corporate body from its trading capital. Moreover, in contrast to its later practice, the members of 
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the early East India Company, like those of the Levant Company voted on the basis of µone man, 
one vote¶, regardless of how many shares they owned.  
 
The trading cRUSRUDWLRQ¶V civic culture resonated broadly among merchants and ministers well 
into the seventeenth century. To their members and proponents, it was the common traditions of 
corporate sociability and government that allowed both regulated and joint stock companies to 
govern and defend English trade and commercial interests overseas. During the mid-seventeenth 
century, however, free trade debate and the institutional development of the joint stock 




The question of whether a particular form of corporate organization was superior emerged only 
gradually during the seventeenth century. Through the first half of the seventeenth century, the 
distinction between company and open trade was more important than that between different 
kinds of corporate organization. The Parliamentary debates in 1604 on the subject of free trade, 
for instance, concerned themselves with the respective merits of free and company trade rather 
than on the relative superiority of the regulated or joint stock corporation. Rather than reflecting 
a clear gentlemanly preference for open joint-stock companies, these debates stemmed from 
broader concerns about corporate exclusivity and revealed an emerging understanding that the 
regulated and joint stock companies were suited to different commercial environments.xxvi Sir 
Edwin Sandys, for example, upheld the organisation of the East India Company as it was ³ILW to 
WUDGH´ to Asia on the basis of a joint stock, while attacking the joint stock Muscovy Company by 
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pointing out that the Levant Company sent out four ships as a regulated company for every one it 
had dispatched as a joint stock.xxvii Nevertheless, the distinction between regulated and joint-
stock companies remained largely subordinate in the early seventeenth century to the wider 
debate between corporate and free trade as writers and pamphleteers often defended and 
condemned joint stock and regulated companies in tandem.xxviii 
 
During the mid-seventeenth century, international developments in (QJODQG¶V overseas trade and 
the intensification of debates within England over free and corporate trade encouraged the rise of 
domestic contests between joint stock and regulated corporations. The intensification of 
European competition for overseas markets and the accumulation of experience of international 
settings encouraged merchants and directors to rethink the corporate organization of overseas 
trade and the domestic justifications for particular corporate forms. Meanwhile, regulated and 
joint stock companies and their respective proponents responded in different ways to calls for 
free trade and renewed attacks on their privileges. Regulated companies emphasized the fact that 
their members traded independently and on their own account and their ability to cultivate 
mercantile experience. Henry Parker, the agent of the Merchant Adventurers in Hamburg, argued 
that for merchants µSDUWLFXODU breeding, such or such a place, in such or such a Trade is UHTXLVLWH¶ 
as µKH that can deale warily enough with Indians, Turks and Barbarians, is not alwaies prepared 
enough to cope with the Jews, Hans Townes, and +ROODQGHUV¶ He also, however, emphasized the 
accessibility of the Merchant Adventurers, as µDQ\ that are qualified for WUDGLQJ¶ could join the 
Company µXSRQ a meane, inconsiderable UDWH¶xxix  
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In contrast to the Levant Company, which stressed its openness and the freedom allowed to its 
members, supporters of the East India Company argued for joint stock on the basis of its ability 
to act as a sovereign power capable of marshaling force and competing with European rivals. 
From its first voyages into the Indian Ocean, the Company showed itself willing to engage in 
belligerent action to further its commercial and political ends.xxx Yet, its limited and short-lived 
joint stocks left it undercapitalized, dependent on unfortified and vulnerable factories, and unable 
to compete successfully with the aggressive and powerful Dutch East India Company. In 1641, 
the merchant and writer, Henry Robinson, argued for an East India Company powerful enough to 
limit the boundless and violent commercial appetites of the Dutch, µ[a] Corporation is must be 
and a powerfull one too; that followed this trade, able to plant Colonies by degrees and make 
head in the Indies if need be against the Hollanders incroaching¶.xxxi A decade later the writer 
George Gardyner contrasted English companies unfavorably with the Dutch. He noted that the 
English had founded companies to secure trade to those countries with which the crown did not 
have diplomatic relations or treaties and where it was µmadnesse without assurance of 
fortification¶ to send merchants, goods, or ships. Yet, rather than acting as governments for the 
promotion of trade, English companies had contented themselves with the exploitation of their 
monopolistic privileges to the private enrichment of their members while allowing their Dutch 
competitors to µgain whole Regions and Provinces, which is still managed to the advantage and 
honour of their Common-wealth¶ and to dominate trade to Asia.xxxii Stronger, better-capitalized 
companies capable of building forts and waging war were needed to compete with the Dutch. 
These lessons were not lost on East India Company servants around Asia.  The council at Surat 
would later cite the Dutch example in advising the Company that 0DFKLDYHOOL¶V admonitions 
about fear and government applied equally to trade: µwe have by the Dutch proceedings largely 
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Experimented it is better in Trade to be feared, then beloved, if faire means will not 
prevayle¶xxxiii  
 
Debates over the corporate form and chartered privileges of the East India Company during the 
Interregnum brought these new, divergent conceptions of regulated and joint stock companies 
into collision. From the later 1640s, former interlopers and merchants anxious to break into 
Asian trade, led by Maurice Thomson, envisioned a µQDWLRQDO VHWWOHPHQW¶ for the East Indian 
trade that varied among proposals from a regulated trade to an enlarged and more inclusive joint 
stock, but emphasized accessibility and colonial settlement.xxxiv Although these proposals offered 
a range of models for the organisation of Asian trade, they notably argued that the regulated 
corporate form, and the Levant Company in particular, offered an attractive balance between 
freedom and government and a superior corporate form for the encouragement of trade, since a 
regulated East India Company would µencourage industry and ingenuity and afford latitude and 
scope for both¶. Moreover, much as Parker argued with reference to the Merchant Adventurers, 
supporters of the regulated model also asserted that these bodies alone were capable of bringing 
up merchants, µwho having the management of their particular concerns must necessarily 
augment their experience and pass it on to their sons and servants¶. Conversely, µin a joint stock 
no man can make it his business to be an East India merchant¶.xxxv With this, opponents of the 
existing East India Company distinguished clearly between the corporate and social models 
underlying both the regulated and joint stock companies for the first time. 
 
Although Thomson linked proposals for a regulated East India Company to plans for colonial 
settlement, arguments that only a sizeable and permanent joint stock would render the East India 
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Company capable of contending with European rivals and planting colonies ultimately won out 
in the face of Dutch competition in Asia.xxxvi In the late sixteen-fifties, the architects of a new 
East India Company, assimilating many of the proposals put forward by Thomson and his 
associates, realized the power of the joint stock as developed in print over the previous two 
decades. After several years of confusion regarding the &RPSDQ\¶V status and future and a four-
year period of de facto open trade that followed the termination of the last of the &RPSDQ\¶V 
temporary joint stocks, the East India Company received a charter in 1657 that greatly enhanced 
its privileges and authority.xxxvii This charter authorized the company to set-up colonies and to 
fortify its establishments and allowed the company to attract significantly greater investment in 
its first permanent joint stock, at once putting it on a stronger and more stable financial 
foundation and enabling it to expand its network of factories and settlements around the Indian 
Ocean. Meanwhile, the &RPSDQ\¶V stock became central to its government. At the Restoration, 
Charles II granted the Company a charter that affirmed the terms of the grant three years earlier 
and changed the basis for corporate elections by awarding a vote for each £500 block of shares 
owned. With the expansion of the &RPSDQ\¶V trade in the wake of the Restoration and the 
growth of its Asian settlements, the responsibilities of the Court of Assistants and governing 
committees grew and the importance of the voting power of smaller shareholders declined 
dramatically.  
 
The East India &RPSDQ\¶V mid-century charters marked a definitive shift in the history both of 
that body and of the English joint stock corporation as the Dutch-inspired emphasis on the ability 
of joint stock companies to marshal force and to maintain a range of factories and commercial 
settlements differentiated that corporate form from the regulated company. According to the East 
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India &RPSDQ\¶V nineteenth-century historian, Sir William Hunter, it was with the charter of 
1657 that the company µcast its medieval skin, shook off the traditions of the regulated system 
and grew into one united, continuous and permanent joint stock corporation¶.xxxviii Although its 
charter still called it a µfellowship¶, the East India Company now rested less on the association of 
its membership than on the shared stock of which they were the proprietors.  With this, the 
company emerged as a new, more powerful body, but one that increasingly appeared to be 
organized along hierarchical rather than fraternal lines and that rested on a different set of 
ideological and political foundations than it had previously. In 1660, it was joined by an equally 
powerful joint stock company chartered to control the growing trade in African slaves - the 
Company of Royal Adventurers Trading to Africa. In 1672, this company was re-established and 
strengthened as the Royal African Company. Charles II gave both these bodies exceptional 
constitutional powers to enforce their monopolies and to establish their jurisdictional authority 
overseas, including the right to establish civil courts to prosecute interlopers on the spot. These 
company vice-admiralty courts represent the high water mark of corporate power.xxxix The East 
India Company acquired similar powers in 1683.xl These new African and Indian companies 
exemplified a different form and style of corporate governance from that of their regulated 
antecedents. This divergence in corporate forms became a source of considerable contest during 




Commercial competition between the Levant and East India Companies sharpened the emerging 
institutional differentiation of regulated and joint stock companies. During the second half of the 
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seventeenth century, propagandists for each began to define the rival bases of these different 
forms of corporate organization and to articulate attacks accordingly.xli In so doing, they also 
significantly expanded the terms of corporate debate from its traditional focus on the rights of 
Englishmen and the relationship between corporate bodies and the state and began to question 
earlier English depictions of the extra-European world as well as the social character of the 
corporation. The different institutional structures of the companies produced different 
approaches to the political economy of overseas trade and different imaginative geographies of 
the extra-European world. In particular, the two FRPSDQLHV¶ experience of non-European 
environments became a key ingredient in the promotion of their rival corporate governance 
models in England. Over the course of the seventeenth century, a standardized corporate 
depiction of non-Europeans as barbarous fractured along corporate institutional lines. Advocates 
for the East India and Royal African Companies argued that trading conditions in Asia and along 
the African coast required the presence of powerful joint stock companies to protect trade and 
manage diplomatic and political interactions with local polities. Supporters of the regulated 
company model, on the other hand, abandoned Maurice 7KRPVRQ¶s association of regulated 
trade and aggressive colonisation and argued instead that merchant experience and mutual gain 
were the foundations for extra-European commerce and looked to the example of the Levant 
Company and the Ottoman Empire to argue that trade with extra-European peoples did not 




Although the Levant and East India Companies were tightly connected through much of the first 
half of the seventeenth century, the two bodies emerged as commercial and political rivals in the 
latter part of the century. Whereas half of the Levant &RPSDQ\¶V directors were also East India 
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Company directors in the sixteenth-twenties, that number dropped to thirty-nine per cent in the 
sixteen-sixties and, by the sixteen-nineties, to fifteen percent.xlii During the early sixteen-eighties, 
factional and party conflict within England led to purges within the East India &RPSDQ\¶V board 
of directors as the total number of shareholders in its stock declined by twenty per cent from 
1675 to 1691 and eight individuals alone came to control over a quarter of its shares.xliii The 
growing trade of the East India Company also turned it into a direct competitor of the Levant 
Company, as shipments of silk from Bengal provided a cheap alternative to the Persian silks that 
Levant merchants brought to England from Ottoman ports.xliv The success of the East India 
Company encouraged Levant merchants to seek both an end to the trade in Persian silks and 
access to the commerce of the Indian Ocean, whether through interloping voyages or by 
demanding that the stock of the East India Company be expanded to allow the entry of new 
investors. 
 
The contest between the Levant and East India Companies evoked fundamentally different 
conceptions of the appropriate commercial, institutional, and social constitution of trading 
corporations. The Levant Company in particular began to seek to alter its exclusive image to 
justify attempts to access new markets. Following the seizure of a vessel that the Levant 
Company dispatched to the Red Sea provinces of the Ottoman Empire in defiance of the East 
India &RPSDQ\¶V monopoly over all English trade to the east of the Cape of Good Hope, the 
Levant merchants argued that they ought to be allowed to trade around the Cape and spared 
competition from the East India Company on the basis that µ[t]he Constitution of the Turkey 
Company being a regulated Company, and not driven by a Joint-stock, is open and 
comprehensive¶.xlv In fact the Company was only µopen¶ to those who qualified for membership 
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by virtue of being µmeer merchants¶ and the &RPSDQ\¶V revised and strengthened charter of 1661 
heightened the exclusive character of the body by mandating that members living within twenty 
miles of London be free of the city and thus also members of one of the its livery companies.xlvi 
The charter and regular orders from the &RPSDQ\¶V Court of Assistants also asserted that none 
should be employed as factors or agents in the Levant but those who were free of the Company 
or µsuch as be the sons or lawfull Apprentices of such freemen¶. xlvii According to the &RPSDQ\¶V 
directors, such restrictions were necessary to sustain (QJODQG¶V trade to the Ottoman Empire, lest 
traders who were unfamiliar with Levantine commerce and customs jeopardize the English 
position there.xlviii To their understanding, µmen are bred, & not Borne to a skill in Merchandize¶, 
and it was the regulated company that provided the means to nurture future merchants.xlix  
Conversely, stock companies were unable to raise up new merchants in a trade: µthe East India 
Company by their Constitution are incapable of breeding up any person under the Notion of an 
East-India Merchant: For they can neither give them Freedom, nor other Priviledge to Trade, as 
the Turkey Company doth, unless they become purchasers of part of the Joynt-stock, as any one 
may do who is Master of Money¶. Such critiques of the East India Company demonstrated a 
conception of the trading company as a society of self-governing merchants, accessible to 
qualified individuals but closed to others. 
 
The East India &RPSDQ\¶V supporters had little patience for such arguments. In response to the 
Levant &RPSDQ\¶V assertion that the East India Company included shareholders who were not 
µlegitimate¶ merchants, µPhilopatris¶, who was probably the East India CoPSDQ\¶V governor and 
major shareholder, Josiah Child, retorted µit matters not two straws to the Kingdom, whether they 
be legitimate in their sense or illegitimate¶.l For Child, the Levant Company and other regulated 
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corporations were indefensible and highly restrictive oligarchies that ought to be opened to all 
µthat are willing to pay the Companies Duties, and submit to the Companies Regulation and 
Orders in other respects¶.li According to Child and others, the joint stock corporation was an 
institution that served the public good by mobilizing private capital towards the pursuit and 
preservation of trade. A collateral (and appealing) effect of this conversion of LQGLYLGXDO¶V money 
into corporate power was the massive financial returns for a small cadre of shareholders who 
controlled the stock. Whereas the East India &RPSDQ\¶V critics attacked it for allowing a relative 
handful of merchants to engross its stock and dominate its government, Child argued that it was 
precisely because its joint stock allowed concentrated ownership and control that the company 
had flourished since the Restoration. Large holdings encouraged care and diligence. Conversely, 
the regulated FRPSDQ\¶V one-man-one-vote formula was a µKHWHURFOLWH¶ and µSHUIHFW GHPRFUDF\¶ 
that saw the majority of shareholders reigning tyrannically over the interests of the minority.lii 
 
The rival corporate models of the Levant and East India Companies contained different 
understandings of the nature of English trade and interaction with the extra-European world. In 
the decades following the Restoration, Charles II granted the African and East India Companies 
a series of charters that greatly expanded their overseas authority, and specifically authorized 
them to make war against non-Europeans, to prosecute interlopers in their own courts, and ± in 
the case of the East India Company ± to exercise martial law over the populations living in its 
settlements. The increasingly broad authority granted to the East India and Royal African 
Companies over English subjects and with regards to non-Christian peoples rested on the 
argument that the extension of English commerce in Asia and Africa depended on corporations 
that could marshal force and political power in the support of trade. From their first creation in 
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the late sixteenth century, trading companies justified their privileges with reference to the 
importance of intimidating non-European peoples. This argument acquired, however, greater 
emphasis and sophistication after the Restoration. The opening of a royal proclamation of 1674 
that reaffirmed the monopoly of the Royal African Company explicitly explained µthat traffique 
with Infidels and Barbarous Nations not in amity with Us, and who are not beholding by any 
League or Treaty¶ could only be carried on from forts and factories maintained by a joint-stock 
company.liii  
 
The Levant Company also defended its privileges on the basis that a corporate structure and 
united society were indispensable for the pursuit of trade among a µEDUEDURXV SHRSOH¶ and at µVR 
remote a distaQFH¶liv The real and perceived challenges of trading to the Ottoman Empire largely 
explain its ability to maintain its privileges as other regulated companies succumbed to domestic 
pressures and the competition of interlopers. Both the Eastland Company and the Merchant 
Adventurers had long struggled to sustain their exclusive privileges in European environments 
where commensurable legal systems and mercantile cultures allowed interlopers and company 
merchants to evade corporate government and where rulers sought to encourage the commerce of 
their own subjects to England.lv Conversely, the survival of companies trading to extra-European 
environments reflected the widespread belief that commerce with Asia and Africa required a 
different form of organisation than that within Europe or to European colonies. George Gardyner 
asserted that there was no need for companies where diplomacy and reliable treaties provided for 
safe trading conditions, µRU else, why are they not in Europe¶ and, in similar terms, the jurist 
Charles Molloy later differentiated the trade of the East Indies and the Levant from that µRQ this 
side the /LQH¶ where commerce could not µEHDU¶ company trade.lvi Such arguments on the part of 
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commercial writers and corporate supporters were, of course, ideological as much as they were 
pragmatic, as the success of interlopers and independent traders in entering into commercial 
relationships with extra-European merchants and rulers illustrates. Both ideologically and 
institutionally, corporate trade rested on and reinforced cultural difference and geographic 
distance. Whereas Jewish and Armenian Ottoman trading networks expanded into the 
Netherlands in the eighteenth century, the commercial controls of the Levant Company 
succeeded in preventing any such penetration of English markets.lvii In the absence of reciprocal 
diplomatic relations between the English and Ottoman sovereigns, the Levant Company 
established itself as the key instrument of English government in the Levant, building its 
authority on the mutually-reinforcing bases of its charter and the SXOWDQ¶V capitulations, which 
granted English communities in the Levant a limited degree of self-government within the 
context of Ottoman legal institutions.lviii 
 
Whereas, however, the East India and Royal African Companies argued that forts, force, and 
joint-stock companies were the only safeguards for English commerce in supposedly insecure 
commercial and political environments, the Levant Company emphasized that the experience of 
its members was the most important prophylactic against supposed Ottoman oppression. The 
new charter that the Levant Company received in 1661 following the Restoration confirmed its 
authority and government over English trade to the Ottoman Empire on the basis that a self-
governing community of merchants, experienced in the µ/DZV and FXVWRPV¶ of the Levant, was 
necessary to pursue and secure commerce to the Ottoman Empire.lix  A broadsheet from the early 
1670s directed against the East India and Royal African Companies thus invoked the example of 
the Levant Company as a corporate body that sustained common expenses and allowed 
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merchants to maintain their commercial privileges while remaining open to new members and 
allowing time to trade independently. It responded to the supporters of joint stocNV¶ µplausible 
Pretence of maintaining of Forts¶ by pointing out that after decades of trade to Asia and Africa, 
the security of trade now lay in experience and mutual advantage, µ>D@t the first Settling of 
Factories in those Countries, it might require some extraordinary Charge; but now we are so well 
acquainted with the Customs both of the Persians and Indians, after almost one hundred years 
Converse and Traffick with them, that instead of seeking to them for their Commodities, we are 
courted for our Gold and Silver¶.lx From this perspective, the experience and expertise of the 
individual merchant and the promise of gain, made unnecessary the threat of collective force that 
underlay the joint stock enterprise. 
 
Regulated and joint stock companies thus offered distinctly different conceptual and ideological 
bases for the organization of extra-European trade. Both regulated and joint-stock companies 
were merchant societies: the question was whether it was better to be a society of equal and 
expert merchants, which regulated companies termed a µunited society¶, or one based on a 
µunited stock¶ and the leadership of a µSelect & authorized council¶.lxi Sir Josiah Child rejected 
the necessity for regulated companies out of hand and instead argued that trade should be 
organized along a joint stock or free basis depending on the political conditions of the trade and 
the ability of the English state to secure the safety of the merchants and ships involved. In place 
of this conception of the company as an association of experienced merchants, the joint stock 
company appeared increasingly as a powerful state that enjoyed the liquidity to build forts, 
borrow money, and wage war.lxii For the opponents of the East India Company, on the other 
hand, the apparent financial strength of that body was actually a major liability because corporate 
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borrowing on the common seal was far more central to company finance for joint stock 
companies and because it was unclear if the immaterial company was a trustworthy debtor. As 
one critic warned, µ>\@ou can neither Arrest, nor Implead great nor small amongst them upon 
their Common Seal; and if you should demand your Money of any particular person, he would 
but laugh at you, and beg you go to the Company with your seal, for he owes you not a Groat¶.lxiii 
Whereas merchants within regulated companies conducted their business as recognizable 
individuals or partnerships, the joint stock company seemed a disturbingly impersonal and thus 
potentially unreliable entity. lxiv 
 
Arguments for and against the joint stock form came to the fore in 1685, in the µgreat case of 
monopolies¶, East India Company vs. Sandys, in which the Company successfully upheld its 
monopoly against interloping merchants.lxv According to the East India &RPSDQ\¶V lawyers, the 
Company was responsible for creating the diplomatic and commercial superstructure that 
allowed for English trade to Asia and the power of a joint stock was necessary to manage that 
trade within the competitive environment of the Indian Ocean. Sir Henry Pollexfen, on the other 
hand, drew on legal conceptions of the corporate form going back to Edward &RNH¶V decision in 
6XWWRQ¶V Hospital to denigrate the joint stock company. Although both regulated and joint stock 
companies were legal and soulless persons, Pollexfen noted that when a merchant did business 
with a member of the Levant Company, he interacted with one with soul and a conscience. He 
accordingly argued that µa Man should know with whom he dealt, who were his Debtors, and 
how to come to them¶, and contrasted such face-to-face dealings with interactions with the East 
India Company: µdealing with you is a kind of dealing with Spirits, an Invisible Body subsisting 
only in intelligentia legis¶. Pollexfen disparaged the East India Company as an ³,QYLVLEOH 
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0HUFKDQW´ and thus as an unreliable agent: µ:ho buys and sells all? The Corporation. Who are 
the Debtors for the Mony, that buys and provides these Merchandizes? The Body Politick, the 
Corporation, the invisible Body. Who shall be sued for these Debts? The Body Politick¶. Like 
other critics of the East India Company and the joint-stock corporate form, Pollexfen argued that 
such an entity could not be relied upon as an acceptable form of either public government or 
private enterprise as it left trade in the hands of an impersonal and soulless entity.lxvi 
 
Although .LQJ¶V Bench ultimately found in favor of the East India Company, the Sandys case 
laid bare opposition to the joint-stock form. This opposition rested in large part on the frustration 
of merchants who found themselves prevented from trading legally to Asia or Africa and unable 
to buy into companies whose stock seemed to have been engrossed by a relative handful of 
members. It also reflected intense unease with the evolution of the joint stock company. As a 
result of the expanded charters granted to the East India and Royal African Companies in the 
third quarter of the seventeenth century and the institutional evolution those bodies had 
undergone that placed power in the hands of small groups, control over these bodies lay no 
longer in an equal association of identifiable individuals, but in an impersonal capital stock. As a 
result, the government of the corporation lay less with the consensus of its members than with 
the ability to accumulate large shareholdings. From this perspective, the development of the 






The Glorious Revolution provoked a profound transition in ongoing debates over the corporate 
organization of overseas trade and the relative utility of joint stock and regulated companies.lxvii 
The dramatic growth of the largely-unregulated English Atlantic economy led to the rise of 
merchant groups in English µRXWSRUWV¶ and colonial cities who sought to use arguments in favour 
of free trade to undermine the traditional dominance of /RQGRQ¶V trading companies. For these 
merchants and others seeking to access the trade of Asia and Africa, the flight of James II and 
3DUOLDPHQW¶V subsequent regulatory ascendance provided a golden opportunity to take on the 
joint stock bodies that controlled those trades and had depended on royal charters for their 
privileges. Interloping merchants successfully lobbied a Parliamentary audience and manipulated 
Parliamentary politics to open the slave trade, while opponents of the East India Company forced 
first a new charter on the body and then the creation of a rival company. It was within the context 
of Parliamentary lobbying that merchants proposed a variety of reforms to the joint-stock 
corporation including some inspired by the regulated company model. Although the Merchant 
Adventurers lost their remaining trading privileges in 1689, the regulated company remained an 
attractive option for the organisation of extra-European trade and pamphlets written against the 
East India Company and Royal African Companies in the decades following the Glorious 
Revolution consistently recommended restructuring (QJODQG¶V Asian and African trade along 
regulated lines.lxviii As bodies that combined features of free trade and corporate regulation, 
regulated companies offered an attractive compromise between joint stock companies and 
unregulated trade. Yet, as opponents of the joint stock companies looked to regulated companies 
as a foil, they also revealed how the changing terms of economic and ideological debate reshaped 
conceptions of the merchant society more broadly. 
 
26 
Opponents of the East India and Royal African Companies seized on what they perceived to be 
the excess political and legal authority enjoyed by those bodies. Pamphlets attacked the East 
India &RPSDQ\¶V use of martial law in St. Helena and the prosecutions it and the Royal African 
Company had launched against interlopers via their vice-admiralty courts.lxix Meanwhile, 
opponents of these bodies decried the insider stock trading and the manipulation of the new trade 
in company shares  - µVWRFN MREELQJ¶ ± that enriched individuals at the expense of the public good 
and fueled the engrossment of shares that had led the East India Company to become µan 
absolute Monopoly, to serve the turns of a few over-ruling Men¶.lxx In 1696, John Pollexfen 
reiterated his EURWKHU¶V earlier critique of the East India Company when he warned the House of 
Lords that to provide a new charter to the East India Company without specifically curtailing its 
authority was to put English manufactures and English commerce at the mercy of a body that 
cared only for its own profits and whose members bore no responsibility for the actions of the 
whole, for µCompanies have bodies, but it is said they have no souls; if no souls; no conscience, 
the common seal being to answer for all bad actions¶. Such bodies were, moreover, less the 
product of the µlabour, diligence, and industry¶ that were the source of (QJODQG¶V wealth than the 
work of the wealthiest of traders who µweary of toil, minute gains, and trading in common upon 
the same foot equal with others¶ used the incorporation of a trade to gain a commercial 
monopoly and dominion over their fellow subjects¶. Unless the English government restricted its 
authority, the East India Company thus threatened to become an entity µbeyond the control of 
laws and government¶ and µan unlimited constitution under a limited monarchy¶.lxxi   
 
Within the context of the fierce assaults on the authority and exclusive privileges of the East 
India and Royal African Companies that followed the Glorious Revolution, the Levant 
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&RPSDQ\¶V relative openness and a trading model that relied on good relations with foreign 
rulers made it a particularly attractive alternative to overbearing and bellicose joint-stock 
companies.lxxii Although it had been subjected to free trade attacks during the Interregnum, the 
Levant Company had no difficulty confirming its privileges at the end of the century.lxxiii 
Meanwhile, the apparent failures of the East India &RPSDQ\¶V attempts to use force in Asia - in 
the brief war against the Mughal Empire in 1688/89 - seemed to confirm for at least some 
merchants and writers that force, and thus joint stock companies, had no place in overseas 
trade.lxxiv One pamphlet calling for the creation of a regulated company to trade to Asia warned 
that the East India &RPSDQ\¶V forts offered little more security µthan Castles in the Air¶ and 
could neither protect the English from the Mughal emperor nor secure English trade at sea from 
attack by European rivals and tended instead to create a µJealousy of us in the Great Mogul, and 
other Princes of India, &c. and tempt us (as it did the New Company) to Contests, which will be 
fatal to us¶.lxxv Instead, pamphleteers and merchants opposed to the East India Company argued 
that English trade to India should be as free as possible and should be supported by an 
ambassador to the Mughal Emperor and consuls in the primary trading ports, as it was to the 
Ottoman Empire.lxxvi From this perspective, the regulated model and example of the Levant 
Company promised to save the English from the temptation of war against Asian or Africa 
polities, while providing multiple buyers and sellers for overseas goods, putting an end to stock-
jobbing, eliminating the potential for large corporate debts, and offering, in the words of an early 
eighteenth-century pamphlet, an alternative corporate structure µwhere every thing relating to 
Trade is concerted and PDQDJ¶G by the whole Body of Adventurers, and not by select 
Committees¶.lxxvii   
 
28 
As had been the case a decade earlier, supporters of the East India Company responded to 
appeals to the regulated company model in the sixteen-nineties by claiming that joint stock 
corporations were actually the more accessible of the two corporate forms and thus the more 
suited to serve a publick good that was increasingly defined in national terms. The East India 
&RPSDQ\¶V supporters contended that the joint stock company was also the more µQDWLRQDO¶ of 
the models, since µin regulated companies the trade is restrained to experienced trading 
merchants and no others¶, whereas in a joint stock µall degrees of the nobility, gentry, clergy, 
widows, orphans, and all degrees of persons, as well as merchants, are or may be concerned in it, 
although not skilled in the said trade¶.lxxviii This now well-established defense of the joint stock 
form was, moreover, one that critics of the East India Company adopted to argue for the failings 
of that body and to push for its reorganization. Rather than calling for a regulated company, 
some opponents of the East India Company urged instead the creation of a µnational joint stock¶. 
Whereas control of the existing Company lay in a few hands, thus turning (QJODQG¶V the trade to 
Asia a matter of µparticular private Interest and %HQHILW¶ enlarging the &RPSDQ\¶V stock and 
making it more widely accessible would transform it into a truly national concern. This would 
ensure that (QJODQG¶V trade with Asia served the public good and it would make that trade µmore 
National, advantageous, and diffusive to the Subject¶.lxxix  
 
Arguments in favor of the national joint stock and the regulated company came together to 
remake the East India Company during the sixteen-nineties. The new charters that confirmed the 
joint stock organization of the East India trade responded to regulated company critiques of the 
East India Company as an excessively hierarchical and exclusive body by expanding its stock 
and reforming the &RPSDQ\¶V voting practices, thus partially returning it to principles of member 
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equality and shared government. In 1693, the Crown added provisions to the &RPSDQ\¶V new 
charter that expanded its stock and altered its governance to prevent the engrossing of shares and 
power into single µRYHUPLJKW\¶ directors like Josiah Child by limiting each member to a 
maximum of ten votes.lxxx  In 1698, Parliament chartered the µNew East India Company¶ (with 
which the existing µOld East India Company¶ would merge a decade later) and dramatically 
increased the size of the FRPSDQ\¶V joint stock, allowing at last many of the former FRPSDQ\¶V 
critics to buy into the Indian Ocean trade. At the same time, this charter also limited 
VKDUHKROGHUV¶ to a single vote, a measure long-advocated by opponents of the existing company 
and by supporters of the regulated company form so as µto prevent the Mischiefs that have 
KDSSHQ¶G by one 0DQ¶V having 100 or 120 Votes, which indeed has been the most fatal occasion 
of the Ruin of the present Company, by introducing an Arbitrary Power amongst them¶.lxxxi 
Meanwhile, the dispatch of an ambassador to the Mughal court following the incorporation of 
the µNew¶ East India Company to obtain a firman parallel to the capitulatory agreements the 
English had received from the Ottoman sultan further suggests that the example of Levant 
Company had real currency in thinking about the reorganization of English commerce to 
India.lxxxii  
 
At the same time the contest over the East India Company reveals the enduring relevance of the 
regulated company, it also shows how the wider context of Parliamentary and public debate 
shaped appeals to the regulated company model. In the face of calls for free trade and 
Parliamentary debates over corporate charters, pamphleteers and merchants advocated for the 
regulated company as a corporate form that seemed to combine free trade with corporate 
regulation. In so doing, proponents of the regulated company emphasized the inclusivity and 
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openness of these bodies while ignoring or discounting the exclusive aspects of the Levant 
Company and other regulated companies and their guild-like restrictions on membership and 
member activity. One author accordingly distanced the regulated company form from 
accusations that it was excessively restrictive by arguing that µCircumscribing¶ of membership to 
experienced merchants was an option for both regulated companies and those trading with a joint 
stock, µbut essential to neither¶.lxxxiii Consequently, and despite accusations from the supporters 
of the East India Company that regulated companies were restrictive bodies, it was possible to 
establish them on inclusive terms. This approach undermined, however, the emphasis on 
principles of apprenticeship and experience that had previously defined the character of the 
merchant society as embodied in the regulated company.lxxxiv  
 
The battle over the Royal African Company further demonstrates how corporate and 
Parliamentary debate reshaped both understandings of the regulated company and the 
constitutions and institutional structures of joint stock companies. In the face of calls to open the 
African trade either through free trade or the creation of a regulated company, Parliament settled 
on a compromise in the 1698 Trade to Africa Act. This legislation gave the Royal African 
Company a statutory basis for its trade, but opened its monopoly to separate traders willing to 
pay a tax on imports and barred the FRPSDQ\¶V agents from sitting on governmental councils or 
on court benches in the colonies, separating corporate power from state power in ways that 
reflected the reforms of the East India &RPSDQ\¶V charter.lxxxv Supporters of the African 
Company responded to criticism that the legislation allowed the Company to survive by 
suggesting that the result was a corporate hybrid, µa Regulated Company with a Joynt Stock . . . 
with a Liberty to all others to Trade upon as easy Terms as the Company it self¶lxxxvi Yet, this 
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body was by no means a regulated company in traditional terms. It restricted membership and a 
role in corporate government to shareholders and, while giving them access to the &RPSDQ\¶V 
forts and facilities, left separate traders outside the corporate society. Instead, this attempt on the 
part of supporters of the Royal African Company to appeal to the regulated company form 
suggests how Parliamentary efforts to combine corporate government and accessibility to trade 
encouraged pamphleteers and merchants to reconceptualize the social and institutional 
foundations of both joint stock and regulated companies. 
 
In the context of Parliamentary debates, the appeal of the regulated company lay in its 
accessibility and regulatory functions, rather than in its manifestation of traditional conceptions 
of a guild-like merchant society. As the time frame for the 1698 Act drew to a close, separate 
traders offered a flurry of proposals both for unregulated trade to the African coast and for 
different models of regulated companies to manage the trade, drawing alternatively from the 
examples of the Levant and Russian Companies, leading pamphleteer and joint stock proponent 
Charles Davenant to complain of how the separate traders, µfly thus from one Constitution to 
another, without considering the true Nature of things¶.lxxxvii One pamphleteer described the 
governing structure of the Levant Company as contained within its 1605 charter as a µGuide in 
the present Settlement of the African Trade¶ that would allow for an open and inclusive 
commerce, while ignoring that &RPSDQ\¶V own conception of itself as a society of expert 
merchants and its earlier arguments that inexperienced traders threatened English trade to the 
Ottoman Empire.lxxxviii In response to other pamphlets that proposed the Levant Company as a 
model for creating a regulated company to govern the African trade, supporters of the Royal 
African Company were quick to point out that the constitution of the Levant Company would 
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exclude most separate traders from the African trade µas illegitimate Persons¶, since they were 
not residents of London or µmeer merchants¶.lxxxix In fact, proposals for a regulated company to 
trade to Africa emphasized the accessibility of that model to the exclusion of its guild-like 
characteristics and thus described a different kind of merchant society than that of the Levant 
Company. Ironically, though, proposals for the remaking of the Royal African Company as a 
regulated body that would allow any merchant to trade upon payment of moderate dues echoed 
Josiah &KLOG¶V own earlier suggestion for remaking the Levant Company into an institution that 
served only to collect duties to fund collective expenses.xc   
 
The contest between regulated and joint stock corporate forms in the wake of the Glorious 
Revolution reshaped the ways in which contemporaries conceptualized and described each.  
Despite the long-standing association of the Glorious Revolution with the overthrow of corporate 
monopolies and the rise of free trade, Parliament ultimately affirmed the need for corporate 
bodies to regulate and safeguard trade in extra-European settings and manage relations with 
extra-European entities. The rivalry between regulated and joint stock forms as reflected in 
pamphlets and Parliamentary debate helped to bring about that outcome. This rivalry produced a 
broad debate that included discussions of the relative superiority of these corporate models as 
well as contests over free, open, and corporate trade. The regulated company remained appealing 
throughout these debates because it could style itself as at once corporate -  and therefore 
governmental and responsible -  and also accessible, inclusive, national and therefore also free. 
The immediate result of these debates was the constitutional reorganization of the East India and 
Royal African Companies in ways that underscored the enduring relevance and appeal of the 
regulated company. Yet, in placing a new emphasis on corporate openness, these debates also 
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underscored the challenges facing the exclusive and traditional conceptions of the merchant 




Although Adam Smith had a famously low opinion of joint stock trading companies, he admitted 
that they could play an important part in the establishment of long distance trades. 6PLWK¶V
LQGLFWPHQWRIWKHUHJXODWHGFRPSDQ\ZDVPRUHFRPSOHWHµTo be merely useless, indeed, is 
SHUKDSVWKHKLJKHVWHXORJ\ZKLFKFDQHYHUMXVWO\EHEHVWRZHGXSRQDUHJXODWHGFRPSDQ\¶.xci 
Smith appreciated the macro-eFRQRPLFFRQWULEXWLRQRIWKHMRLQWVWRFN¶VGLVWLQFWLYHIHDWXUH ± its 
capital. The regulated company, on the other hand, appeared to sustain the worst kind of vested, 
µJRYHUQPHQWDOLW\¶LQWUDGHWKDWVPDFNHGRIDE\-gone medieval past. In spite of such skepticism, 
LWZDVWKHUHJXODWHGFRPSDQ\¶Vability to provide government where the state could or would not 
that explained the persistence of that form through the eighteenth century. Yet, as with joint 
stock companies, the survival of regulated corporations rested with constitutional alteration. In 
1753, and much as they had done three years previously in replacing the vestigial Royal African 
Company with the regulated Company of Merchants Trading to Africa, Parliament threw the 
Levant Company and its trade open to all would-be participants on payment of a £20 entry fee.xcii 
This reform of the corporate structures of British trade to Africa and the Levant made real the 
image of the regulated company frequently presented in pamphlet debates following the Glorious 
Revolution and underscored a new understanding of merchant societies that privileged their 
DFFHVVLELOLW\WRQDWLRQDODQGµGLIIXVLYH¶PHUFDQWLOHSURZHVVRYHUWKHROGHPSKDVLVRQH[FOXVLYLW\
and expertise.  
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6PLWK¶V portrait of regulated and joint stock companies skipped over the history of constitutional 
change and corporate rivalry that substantially reshaped the institutional and social foundations 
of seventeenth-century trading companies. The interlocking history of regulated and joint stock 
companies demonstrates, however, that the globalization of English trade, the intensification of 
intra-European competition for the fruits of overseas trade, and the changing ways in which the 
(QJOLVKVWDWHUHJXODWHGLWVVXEMHFWV¶DFFHVVWRWUDGHtransformed the appearance of these bodies, 
altered the relationship between them, and amended their respective constitutions. Seventeenth-
century corporate and commercial debate did not result in a victory for free over company trade; 
WKHWUDGLQJFRUSRUDWLRQ¶VSUHVWLJHDQGXWLOLWy at the beginning of the eighteenth century was much 
the same as it had been at the beginning of the seventeenth. Instead, by internalizing debate about 
WKHEHVWZD\VWRVWUXFWXUH(QJODQG¶VRYHUVHDVWUDGHZLWKLQUDWKHUWKDQZLWKRXWWKHFRUSRUDWH
form, the public debate about the corporate constitution  - emblematized by the Levant Company 
and the East India Company - strengthened the appeal of the corporate form across the 
seventeenth century. Most notably, in subordinating the joint stock company to the government 
of the plurality of its members and to state supervision, ministers, members of Parliament, and 
merchants made the joint stock form politically palatable for coming centuries. This was an 
outcome that rested, however, on public debates involving both regulated and joint stock 
companies and on the resulting mutual influence of these corporate forms. Rather than being a 
mere victim of innovating and energetic joint stocks or free trading impulses, the regulated 
company model proved vital to sustaining the corporate model and central to an early modern 
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